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HOW COMPREHENSIVE IS A
"COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME OF IMPROVEMENT?"
In Urban Renewal Agency v. Spines' the Supreme Court of Kansas
was asked whether a condemnee is entitled to the enhanced value
accruing to his property as a result of a private development endorsed
by an urban renewal agency but not part of a renewal project. This
question arose after the Urban Renewal Agency of Wichita2 desig-
nated a downtown renewal project, the boundaries of which encom-
passed facing parcels of land, one owned by defendant Spines. The
second parcel once belonged to a railroad, but after the Agency desig-
nated the project boundaries, a third party, Garvey, purchased the
land and undertook construction of a $10 million office building.3
The Garvey building proceeded without formal approval by the
Agency,4 but there was an informal understanding that the Agency
was agreeable to the construction of the building within the project
area., More important, the Garvey building was financed solely from
private sources.6 When the Agency ultimately condemned the Spines
property,7 the owners claimed that the improvement to the Garvey
land had enhanced the value of their property, but the Agency re-
fused to consider the enhancement.8
When the Agency appealed the trial court's determination that the
Garvey improvement should be considered in appraising the Spines
property, the supreme court affirmed the decision below and rejected
the Agency's contention with this statement:
Reduced to its simplest form, the appellant contends land values
are frozen within the project area designated by the Urban
1. 202 Kan. 262, 447 P.2d 829 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Spines].
2. Hereinafter referred to as "the Agency."
3. Letter from Thomas C. Triplett, attorney for Appellee, to Dennis L. Witt-
man, Oct. 23, 1969.
4. 202 Kan. at 263, 447 P.2d at 830.
5. The urban renewal project called for construction of a library-civic center
complex. Supra note 3.
6. 202 Kan. at 263, 447 P.2d at 830.
7. The Garvey property was never condemned or taken, though the Agency
had authority to do so. Id.
8. The difference in the two values amounted to $8,000-$70000 valuation
without considering the Garvey office building; $78,000 considering the building.
Id.
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Renewal Agency once the project area is designated and defined.
This we cannot accept. The effect of the appellant's position
would permit an Urban Renewal Agency to freeze the value of
property to be condemned, perhaps for years, by merely draw-
ing the preliminary boundaries of a project to include all ad-
jacent property which might be developed by private enterprise,
without any actual intention or plan to devote it to public use. 9
In essence, the court adopted the conclusion urged by the landowners 0
and rejected the Agency's warning that "[t]o hold that an improve-
ment within the same designated project area begun because of the
project and in line with the plan of the project can be used in valuing
other lands and improvements in the project would have far-reaching
effects.""
On its face, the Spines decision reaffirms three principles12 pertain-
ing to the just compensation 3 of landowners in a condemnation
proceeding under eminent domain. Briefly these principles are: (1)
the landowner has a constitutional right to just compensation; 14 (2)
the determination of compensation is a valuation process, 5 and the
most practical method of making the valuation determination is to
ascertain what courts'0 have come to call, somewhat redundantly, 7
9. Id. at 265, 447 P.2d at 832.
10. Brief for Appellee at 5, Urban Renewal Agency v. Spines, 202 Kan. 262,
447 P.2d 829 (1968).
11. Brief for Appellant at 5.
12. 4 NicHoLs' THE LAW or EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.1 (J. Sackman 3d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS'].
13. The term "just compensation" is fraught with pitfalls. When courts use it,
they usually mean the market value of property acquired. A. JAHR, EMINENT
DO.iAIN VALUATION AND PROCEDURE § 35 (1957). "To judges and text writers
the term connotes a payment in money for the value of the property which the
owner lost because of the taking by condemnation." Id. One court's definition
of the term is: "[Valuing the property in such a way as not to diminish or depre-
ciate its value because of steps taken by the public authority in carrying out its
plan." City of Cincinnati v. Mandel, 9 Ohio Misc. 235, 224 N.E.2d 179 (C.P.
Hamilton County 1966).
14. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). The definition of just com-
pensation used in Miller was: "[T]he full and perfect equivalent in money of the
property taken. The owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken." Id. at 373.
15. 4 NicHOLs' § 12.1.
16. "[T]he ultimate power to determine the question of valuation lies with the
judiciary." Id. § 12.1[3].
17. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
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"fair market value;"' 8 and (3) the valuation process is to occur at
the time of taking.' 9
Essential to the Agency's case was a claim that the facts in Spines
called for application of the rule established in Miller v. United
States,20 qualifying the traditional principle of valuing property at
the time of taking. As set forth by the Spines court, the Miller rule
states that:
[]he condemning authority is not obligated to pay for an en-
hancement in the fair market value of the property which occurs
as a result of the public improvement made before the date of
taking. That is, the landowner is not entitled to the additional
value resulting as part of the comprehensive scheme of improve-
ment, which requires the taking of his and other property.2 '
In holding that the Miller rule was not applicable, 22 the court re-
jected the Agency's contention that the enhancement in the value of
Spines's land could be considered to have resulted from the "compre-
hensive scheme of improvement." 23 The Agency had based its con-
tention on the fact that the original plan called for public and private
development and that the Garvey building was stimulated by the
project and was in conformity to it.
As both parties suggested in Spines, there are few cases2' with a
18. Fair market value is defined most frequently as the "amount of money
which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy the property would pay to an
owner willing but not obliged to sell it." 4 NICHOLS' § 12.2[1].
19. Id. § 12.23. The time of taking is explained as follows: "The value of real
estate is by no means constant, and before compensation can be intelligently as-
sessed for the taking of land by eminent domain, a point of time must be fixed
as of which the property is to be valued; and it is the value at that time which
the owner is entitled to receive, even if the value of the land rises or falls before
the money is actually paid to him ....
"All jurisdictions are agreed upon the proposition that the property should be
evaluated as of the time of taking, but there is great diversity of opinion as to
just when that point of time occurs." Id.
20. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
21. 202 Kan. at 264, 447 P.2d at 831 (emphasis added). For the most concise
statement of the Miller rule, see 4 NICHoLs' § 12.31511]. The rule is essentially
an exception to the notion that a property owner's just compensation is fair market
value at the time of the taking. For examples of how the rule works, see United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), and Harris v. Commissioners, 151 Kan.
946, 101 P.2d 898 (1940).
22. 202 Kan. at 265, 447 P.2d at 831.
23. Brief for Appellant at 2-6.
24. See generally Haley v. State, 406 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1966), cited in Spines
at 265, 447 P.2d at 832.
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similar fact pattern. One of the few is Steck v. City of Wichita,25
with which the Spines decision is consistent. Steck was a condemna-
tion proceeding under eminent domain, in which the city sought the
condemnee's land for flood control use. Between the time the project
was conceived and the date of taking, subdivisions developed near
the condemnee's property. The Steck court held that the landowner
should receive damages based upon a valuation of his property for
subdivision uses, rather than its existing agricultural use.26
The Spines court's treatment of Steck is noteworthy because it men-
tions the latter only for its affirmation of the Miller rule.2 7 Yet, in
neither Steck nor Spines did the court find that the landowner's
enhanced value resulted from the public project, a conclusion that
would have meant invocation of the rule. Instead, the public agency
in each case paid the enhanced value stemming from the private
projects.
Perhaps the similarity in the cases lulled the court in Spines into
an unthinking application of the traditional approach without care-
ful consideration of the "comprehensive scheme of improvement"
language of the Miller rule.28 Because of the relationship of the
public to the private project in each case, the two decisions are dis-
tinguishable. In Steck, the subdivisions were private developments
on land at a distance from the flood control project, though dose
enough to influence the value of the condemnee's land.29 In Spines,
the private development sat within the designated public project's
very boundaries. 0 Of course, the public flood control project in Steck
might have encouraged subdivision development, since the reduction
of the flood threat and attendant problems would have made the
land more appealing to housing developers. Although the relation-
ship between the public and private projects in Steck might have been
remote, in Spines it was much closer. For instance, the private de-
velopers in Spines constructed the Garvey building with the tacit
approval of the Agency. Furthermore, although the Garvey land was
bought directly from the previous owner instead of the Agency,
everyone concerned viewed the developers as at least within the "spirit
25. 179 Kan. 305, 295 P.2d 1068 (1956) [hereinafter referred to as Steck].
26. Id. at 305, 295 P.2d at 1070.
27. 202 Kan. at 264, 447 P.2d at 831.
28. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
29. 179 Kan. at 307, 295 P.2d at 1071.
30. 202 Kan. at 263, 447 P.2d at 830.
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of the project." 31 Indeed, the renewal plan fully contemplated and
encouraged private projects like the Garvey building3a This fact
leads to the inference that implicit in the project plan was a "com-
prehensive scheme" for both public and private development within
the urban renewal area.
The Kansas urban renewal statute33 is typical in that it does not
contemplate the question raised in Spines, and courts have not ex-
tended the enhancement doctrine of the Miller rule to cover these
situations. Yet almost all urban renewal projects are a mixture of
public and private activity. Separating the two for valuation purposes
is difficult. Generally, courts wish to avoid overcompensation where
land increases in value because the comprehensive scheme of improve-
ment requires the taking of property. Frequently, however, property
values decline within the project's boundaries when urban renewal
plans are announced. 34
To deal with this loss in value, a line of cases has developed in
which courts "roll back" the date of valuation. They avoid penalizing
the condemnee for depreciation in value35 attributable to the renewal
agency's activities. To do this, the courts have held that fair market
value in these instances is either (1) the amount of money the prop-
erty would bring in the market "just before it generally was known
31. Supra note 3.
32. Id.
33. The relevant portion is KAN. GEx. STAT. ANN. § 17-4744 (1964):
A municipality, to the greatest extent it determines to be feasible
in carrying out the provisions of this act, shall afford maximum
opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the municipality
as a whole, to the rehabilitation or redevelopment of the urban
renewal area by private enterprise ....
34. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52
(Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1963). Tenants on welfare in buildings to be con-
demned often must vacate well in advance of the actual demolition of buildings.
Other tenants also are likely to leave. Vacant buildings soon become the targets
of vandals and scavengers who rip out plumbing and anything else that will bring
a price. By the time the urban renewal agency finally begins formal acquisition,
the area resembles a ghost town, dotted by empty shells of structures worth only
a small percentage of their value at the time immediately before the urban renewal
project was announced. Id.
35. Compare City of Baltimore v. United Five & Ten Cent Stores, Inc., 250
Md. 361, 243 A.2d 521 (1968) with Urban Renewal Agency v. Monsky, 436
S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1968) and City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525,
190 N.E.2d 52 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1963).
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that the project was to be performed;"3 or (2) the value "imme-
diately before the city took active steps to carry out the work of the
project which to any extent depreciated the value of the property."37
If the property owner is to be given consideration when values
diminish, the fact that public knowledge of a project causes an en-
hancement in value should not force the condemnor to pay compen-
sation based upon an inflated market valuation.38 After all, the
purpose of the market value standard for compensation is to ensure
that land valuation will be made as fairly and objectively as possible
for both condemnor and condemnee. 39
In eminent domain proceedings to acquire land for urban renewal,
the date on which the project plans are announced should be taken
as controlling for valuation purposes. If so, any increase or decrease
in value would be attributable to the project, and the more reason-
able time of valuation would not be the "taking" date but the date
immediately prior to the announcement of the project.
36. Urban Renewal Agency v. Monsky, 436 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1968). The time
at issue in Monsky was just before the project plans were made public. Id. at 78.
Furthermore, the court said the rationale was not only to prevent penalizing the
landowner, but also to prevent the condemnor from being required to pay for
enhancement in value attributable to the project proposal. Id.
37. City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (Ct.
App. Cuyahoga County 1963). Here the trial court ruled that the proper standard
was the fair market value at the time of trial. The trial was in 1963, six years
after the project was undertaken and tenants on welfare were ordered to begin
leaving condemnee's property. Id. at 527. 190 N.E.2d at 54. One court reached
the same result by interpreting the state's statutory use of the term "fair market
value" as:
The ... value of property... as of the valuation date... plus
the amount, if any, by which such price reflects a diminution in
value occurring between the effective date of the legislative au-
thority for the acquisition of such property and the date of actual
taking if the trier of facts shall find that such diminution in
value was proximately caused by the public project ... or an-
nouncements of . . . its public officials concerning such public
projects.
City of Baltimore v. United Five & Ten Cent Stores, Inc., 250 Md. 361, 243 A.2d
521 (1968). The court allowed the jury to consider diminution over a six-year
period from the date of the ordinance designating the project area to the date of
the ordinance under which condemnee's property was acquired. Id.
38. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. But see 4 NicHOLS' § 12.3151[2],
suggesting that although property owners are given consideration when values
diminish, many courts do not thereby preclude owners from realizing any en-
hanced value when that is the case. The decisions are mixed and the suggestion
is only that the agency in Spines might have pressed the argument along these
lines.
39. Annot., 147 A.L.R. 66, 67-68 (1943).
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Announcement of a project may drive values down within desig-
nated boundaries, but it also may attract private developers like
Garvey. Encouraged by the urban renewal agency and capable of
moving more quickly, private developers can begin their projects and
have them near completion before formal acquisition of land for the
public portion of the project is begun. Without the knowledge and
assurance that a public project eventually will be undertaken, it is
doubtful that private developers would have much interest in neigh-
borhoods like the one in which the Spines property was located.40
Emphasizing the significance of the announcement of an urban
renewal project in no way suggests that a taking occurs at that point.
The suggestion is only that to establish the fair value of property
eventually taken for renewal, the more reasonable time at which to
view the market for the property is the date the public knows of the
project, not the date that proceedings begin for formal acquisition.
Dennis L. Wittman
40. On this point the counter-argument in Spines's behalf would be that Garvey
could have constructed the ofice building even without the Agency's civic center
project. Such an argument raises issues of comparative valuation, beyond the
scope of this comment. For more detail on comparative valuation, see 1969 URIAN
L. ANN. 176.
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